A Norfolk Southern Policy Lets Officials Order Crews to Ignore Safety Alerts

TPM Article Topics
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I live nearest to a BNSF line currently so am more familiar with their rules than those of other railroads. Generally when a detector goes off, it transmits a tone on the road channel (the radio channel the dispatcher and trains in the dispatcher’s territory monitor and communicate on) and tells the crew to stop the train because a defect has been detected. The defect could be hot box (overheated bearing), dragging equipment, or a “hi/wide” clearance issue - depending on the detector type. If the “talker” doesn’t announce it right away, the crew can query it for the number of axles from the “head end” of the train. If everything is OK, most detectors will announce the axle count, the speed, and the ambient temperature - in very busy areas, these “everything is fine” messages are sometimes disabled as it eats radio time … but the data still makes it to the dispatchers.

I’m a little surprised that NS has a rule that allows a train to proceed to the next detector after a defect has been flagged. Usually, what happens is the crew stops the train and at least one crew member walks back to the location of the defect to see what is there. Now, they might move some distance past the detector so as not to block crossings or rail junctions, but not, like, 10 miles and it would be at “restricting speed” (able to stop within half the engineer’s sight distance max 15 mph). Also note that this part of the job sucks given 10000’ and longer trains and that railroads are not a “fair weather” operation. Plus … only two people in the cab in 2023 (and really, since the late 80s/early 90s).

It’s been true for nearly 200 years that the railroad’s “book of rules is written in blood”.

Oh … and there are two general rule regimes: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Code_of_Operating_Rules and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northeast_Operating_Rules_Advisory_Committee - you have to be rules qualified in the one where you work. Canadians have their own. There are RR-by-RR variations, but they are substantially similar within the two regimes.

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Yeah, I don’t get that part. If the thing about the dispatcher allowing the crew to take the train to the next detector after the first one going off is true … wow. Why have the detectors at all?

Everyone here, and in the affected area, can rest assured and be comforted that Norfolk Southern, the company that refused to install toilets in locomotives for the longest time, have battalions of the finest lawyers working round the clock to figure out how this is the crew’s fault.

https://scholar.lib.vt.edu/VA-news/VA-Pilot/issues/1997/vp970827/08270584.htm

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Snark?

I watched the CNN Townhall with Jake Tapper last night where the NS CEO was grilled by eight local town people:

Lot of the observations/questions being asked here by TPMers were also by the folks most effected.

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I know - for a fact - that federal air brake rules are purposefully avoided by RR officers. Shortcuts are expected, like checking only the rear brakes before departure. Crews that follow the law will be hounded.

Oh, and when things go wrong, as when a FRA inspector observes a rules violation, the RR will lay all the blame on the crew.

Most inspections find nothing wrong. Simple things like a brake shoe slow to release, or a hot exhaust on a refrigerated load, may trigger a detector.

Management simply decided to go with the odds and hope the next detector is clear.

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CNN knows how to put on a show and they did. Don’t confuse this with real life (not, in any way, defending NS but am indicting CNN …)

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There are millions of managers at all levels and, really, workers too, who don’t understand that if the Fire Dept is out all the time fighting fires that the system has failed. The desired condition is that FD never responds to a fire (ignore for a minute that, in 2023, most FDs are actually EMS departments that send the wrong equipment most of the time).

The desired condition is that no failed equipment detector ever detects failed equipment! Assuming that the detector not going off accurately indicates that there are no defects (ignore for a minute that they are NOT perfect) then this is a good thing, not a reason to ignore them when they do!

But alas, I don’t have an MBA so clearly I am mis-thinking.

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Well at least it wasn’t Faux outrage.

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Are such policies used on passenger trains?

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On the upside, they presumably set a new world record for the largest sand candle ever made. :roll_eyes:

…dumped thousands of gallons of molten paraffin wax in the city of Sandusky.

But seriously, thanks especially to @plaws for some obviously knowledgeable comments.

As a newly retired natural gas utility engineer–like railroads, also subject to regulation by the US DOT–and somewhat familiar w/ our pipeline control rooms, I’m a little more understanding of the idea that there’s some discretion allowed as to when and how to respond to operational sensor data.

Mostly, the organization and operators should learn and train w/ experience about which alarms (are likely to) demand immediate attention and which may be ‘managed’ (for example, a pipeline pressure that’s lower than we’d ‘like’ due to high demand, but also knowing that the demand will also trend down shortly as people finish breakfast and morning routines and head into work).

But, as in this case where they obviously DIDN’T, you’d also better guess CORRECTLY–you’d better have a damn good story as to why you didn’t act on the alarm!

Also, for any who didn’t see it, that video footage is definitely worth a watch (flames at about 19 seconds in)!?! :flushed:

I was glad to hear of the widespread use of so-called hot box detectors. I was thinking to myself that w/ the availability of infrared cameras these days, wheel bearing overheating should be pretty easily assessed. Sensors on each axle/wheel is ever better (IF they’re paid attention)!

Finally, I’m also glad others are putting these issues of “deregulation” and “bad outcomes” together. I made a similar point recently about weak or unenforced building codes contributing to the tragic and incredibly huge body count and destruction from the recent (and previous) earthquake(s) in Turkey and Syria (or the FL building collapse). I’ll also note that such issues aren’t ONLY for government(s), but that private industry–esp. in the form of insurance companies–also have a role to play in assessing risk and charging premiums accordingly.

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Precision railroading: fuck the employees, fuck safety, fuck the general public.

Still, how the hell did the Biden administration let this get away from them? OK, no one was killed, and cabinet level officials don’t normally descend on a non-fatal incident.

But Buttigieg should have been there the first week rather than let the Republicans turn it into a circus.

Democrats won’t win in 2024 over Ukraine, but they could lose over mishandled domestic incidents. In today’s fact free environment, the substance of administration aid Is less important than how the average clod perceives it as filtered by the corporate media.

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How many big shot bankers went to the gray bar in 2008?

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Skipping a tripped detector? No.

Passenger trains are generally shorter. They also have something freight trains no longer have, the ability to back up and pick up a brakeman after he has inspected the train.

On a passenger train a brakeman doesn’t need to walk back up to the engine after an inspection. The train can safely back up because there is a conductor to watch rearward movements.

The cabooses made trains much safer. We know that the defect was caught by a business’ security camera 30 minutes before the wreck. Had there been a trainman at the rear of this train he would likely have seen or smelled the overheated axle before failure.
image

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Ohio burning:

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A [NS] spokesperson said that the company’s detector network is a massive safety investment, and that its trains rarely require troubleshooting.

BS. The Sandusky OH train wreck last Oct had a similar wheel bearing problem. m Here is the video closeup of the E Palestine train passing a sensor in Salem OH about 20 miles away. The entire undercarraige is burning bright from one or more bad bearings.(center of pic, 3 major lights in a horizontal line).

Screen Shot 2023-02-23 at 11.22.43 AM
Screen Shot 2023-02-23 at 11.22.43 AM1358×708 103 KB

Seems a no-brainer that there should be major regulations required to reduce 3+ derailments/day.

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I guess it’s an improvement that it’s no longer the rivers!? :thinking: :smirk: :man_facepalming:

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Sadly, passenger trains aren’t very long (even compared to 30 years ago) and crew members can get back on at the rear of the train.

Didn’t the hot bearing trip the detector? And NS said “keep going”, right? If the brakeman (who has been working on his rest for 3 months) in the caboose “saw smoke” or “a glow” 1/2 a mile away, why would NS not say “keep going” in that instance, too?

Non-revenue cars with paid employees aren’t coming back - that fight was lost 40 years ago (longer on the FEC, if memory serves).

This isn’t a technology problem, this is (when you dig to the bottom) a greed problem that capitalism cannot solve.

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Thanks for offering us your industry knowledge. The hive always seems to have someone with experience in the topic of the day which enriches our conversations immeasurably

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Yes. A detector was tripped but the dispatcher told them they could keep running.

I posted a bean-counter’s reason earlier for why the RR might gamble and require a second detector tripping before stopping a train.

As for them ordering a train to continue when a clear hazard is present, the conductor is very much the captain of a ship. His first priority is the safety of his crew and the people near the train. I can’t imagine any conductor or trainman would ever accept an order like the one described when they were aware of a defect.

I’ve ridden a couple of trains into the dirt over the course of my career. It is something one strives to avoid.

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Passage is from NTSB prelim report which I have yet to read but is linked to the article above. Settles some questions I had.

‘’“On the Fort Wayne Line of the Keystone Division, NS has equipped its rail network with HBD systems to assess the temperature conditions of wheel bearings while en route. The function of the HBD is to detect overheated bearings and provide audible real-time warnings to train crews. Train 32N passed three HBD systems on its trip before the derailment. At MP 79.9, the suspect bearing from the 23rd car had a recorded temperature of 38°F above ambient temperature. When train 32N passed the next HBD, at MP 69.01, the bearing’s recorded temperature was 103°F above ambient. The third HBD, at MP 49.81, recorded the suspect bearing’s temperature at 253°F above ambient. NS has established the following HBD alarm thresholds (above ambient temperature) and criteria for bearings:

  • “Between 170°F and 200°F, warm bearing (non-critical); stop and inspect
  • “A difference between bearings on the same axle greater than or equal to 115°F (non-critical); stop and inspect
  • “Greater than 200°F (critical); set out railcar’’
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The report linked at in the article is general-audience readable. Seeing subsequent reports, once the NTSB has a chance to review dispatch center records and organizational processes, should be interesting.

Reading between the lines (i.e., making shit up - I don’t work for any railroad or associated industry but I have been a keen observer thereof since, my parents told me, age 3), I can’t help but wonder if there is a process in place to look at the data collected from a train point of view and not from a detector point of view. Here, the the Monday Morning report pretty clearly shows that there is a journal bearing is in the process of failing. Per the rule book, once a hot box detector showed the bearing exceeded 200 F, the train was stopped (as it was derailing, as it turns out).

I have no idea what an every-day journal bearing operating temperature range is but I do know that most mainlines are cleared for individual cars grossing 143 tons (“286k” cars) so divide that by four and each axle, with a bearing on each side, is carrying roughly 1/4 of 286,000 lbs, so each axle is carrying about 71,500 lbs if the car is fully loaded. That HAS to generate heat!

How much heat, I don’t know, and I also don’t know how it varies uphill, downhill, or on track that isn’t straight (“tangent”). And since brakes on freight cars are shoes pressed against the wheel tread – another commenter mentioned detectors reporting stuck hand brakes tripping detectors – that is another source of heat that might trip the detector.

But all that is quantifiable and has mostly been quantified by the RRs themselves … so shouldn’t that “200 degrees and stop” rule be variable based on those quantities?

And then there’s the trend:

MP 79.9 - 38°F
MP 69.0 - 103°F 
MP 49.8 - 253°F

Unless those unknown-to-me factors justify ignoring a ~70°F rise in temperature over 10 miles of line, shouldn’t there be a process in place to change what the train is doing? I.e., reduce to Restricting Speed (15 mph or less) until the next detector or if there is a convenient siding, stop and inspect … even though things aren’t yet at 200°F?

And then there is the train’s consist. Car 23, where the bearing failed – detectors count axles, so NTSB has already converted the axle number to the car number – was not the car carrying hazmat; those were 5 cars back. Is there a procedure in place to modify those “stop the train” rules when the car that has the hotbox is carrying hazmat? (in this instance the car with the failing bearing was not one with the hazmat lading).

Hazmat tank cars were “DOT 105” - description of DOT types here: https://www.bts.gov/surveys/annual-tank-car-facility-survey/tank-car-specifications-terms

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