Ah yes. Joe Schlabotnik. Peanuts was the first cartoon strip the ending of which shook me. It had been there my entire childhood and adult life. Steve Canyon and Prince Valiant ending did not shake me. Nor Blondie & Dagwood. But Peanuts ending, that was sobering.
I was referring to Mario Cuomoâs kid. Mostly. But you make a good point.
Mario was a NIMBY lawyer for the white Italian enclaves in Corona. That was how he made himself known and enabled his political career. He lost the Mayoral Primary to the execrable Ed Koch, who eventually outdid the Queens hack in promoting the poison of ethnic divisiveness during his 12 years as Mayor and his post Mayor TV talking head career. Became Governor and then grandiose and sold the myth of himself as a deep thinker, quoting Pierre Teilhard de Chardin to the adoring NY Press. Did a Hamlet Act, should I run for President? Or let the low rent Bill Clinton run and lose against GHWB? Should I accept being the Ambassador to the UN or is that not grandiose enough for me, Mario Cuomo? Is the SCOTUS grandiose enough for me, Mario Cuomo?
Until he lost to George Elmer Pataki. The most charisma lacking politician ever.
I canât remember back that far.
I agree. But I think it was because he didnât have to reach the Constitutional underpinnings to justify that position, which I suspect would raise unforeseen issues on review. Instead, Judge Mehta relied on prior instances of Congressional investigations into the conduct of the President that occurred prior to an impeachment inquiry, citing the âSenate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, better known as the Watergate Committee,â and the âSpecial Committee to Investigate Whitewater Development Corporation and Related Matters.â
Trump couldnât swim across the small end of a high-school pool. All we should need is an ankle bracelet and a couple of retirees to make sure that no one helps him off the island.
All of the above.
I donât believe thatâs a completely fair or accurate characterization of all your comments last week.
Certainly the Trump crime family will âraiseâ that issue. But as Iâve previously noted, the family is completely enmeshed in the business dealings at issue: Uday, Qusay, Jarvanka. Not different in any relevant respect from a mob family. Iâm sure that will be more than adequately discussed in briefing and argument, and should dispose of âprivacyâ concerns.
This is hardly a fair characterization of the memo/order, which Iâve read in full, footnotes included. All Mehta did was address, seriatim, the arguments the plaintiffs raised. Thatâs not âpiling argument upon argumentâ; thatâs not âthrowing the kitching sinkâ; thatâs simply good judicial practice and good legal reasoning.
Appeals to the courts of appeal (in this case, the federal circuit courts) are a matter of right. There is no discretion to hear the appeal or not, although it can be disposed of in short order if the judges are so inclined. The SCOTUS, and only the SCOTUS is where discretion and cert come in. Not a good idea to conflate the two.
I canât speak to the SCOTUS. My experience is in the federal district courts, which is more relevant to this discussion in any event. I donât know a single law clerk who wasnât intimately and regularly involved in drafting orders. Including me.
Well, exactly. You donât reach a Constitutional issue unless you have to, and he didnât have to. No reason to go there. Iâm not at all certain, however, that the specific Art I Sec 5 issue you mentioned is at the heart of the case. A good enough reason not to go there.
I imagine they did the research and brought it to and discussed it with him, most probably at length and in depth. But, my ideal would have been drafting and editing and passing it back and forth. And my adversary informed me that he and the other clerks had absolutely no hand in the drafting of Souterâs opinions. I am sure he was intimately involved in everything else. I consider Judge Mehtaâs ruling to be more in the nature of a SCOTUS opinion than the typical District Court Orde, which might summarize an opinion ruling for the Docket. But I get your point.
if you read my comments on THIS case, you will see that Iâve said that all it needs is a legislative pretext to succeed eventually. Other cases, especially those concerning executive privilege, are going to be a lot more complicated.
The question isnât the evetual disposition right now. Its whether a preliminary injunction is issued. And I think that the scope of the subpoena, when combined with the concerns under the Bank Privacy Act, make a reasonable case for a preliminary injunction. (not a prediction, just an observation).
But when Mehta says that the possibility of impeachment is sufficient to compel document production, Team Trump cannot ignore that statement when it files its appeal â it pretty much has to dispute it. Which means that if the appeals court accepts the case, it will have to deal with those questions.
And this may be important in the decision to review the case â because the âimpeachmentâ issue was not raised by either the House nor Team Trump in its filings. The JUDGE brought it up during oral arguments obliquely.
(I pointed out that his choice to cite Watergate and Whitewater was probably because he wanted to make a point about impeachment â others scoffed at that. But then Mehta goes and cites impeachment in his decisionâŚ) 
excellent point â i did conflate the two. I wonât do it again.
But doesnât the appeals court have the option of not issuing a stay pending appeal? And if that is the case, given the time constraints, would a decision to not grant a stay perform the same function as not granting certification, because by the time the appeal is scheduled, the case would be moot?
Understood. The only nit Iâd pick is that, again IME (which is not extensive) district courts do issue memorandum opinions as the reasoning behind their orders, and this is not infrequent. I wouldnât classify any of them as in the nature of SCOTUS opinions, but perhaps in the direction of an opinion of Court of Appeal⌠not to mention explaining the lower courtâs reasoning to said appellate court.
Well, we know the answer to that now.
The judge didnât. I believe he described the arguments as ânot seriousâ.
You might want to review the distinction between âsufficientâ and ânecessaryâ.
What point would that be? The only point made in his decision was that impeachment was not necessary to compel the production at issue in the case. Which is what the âscoffersâ have been saying all along.
First, while Iâm not denying they exist, I donât recall seeing any such âscoffersâ. Iâve consistently said that as long as there is a legislative pretext, its going to get through the courts. (I HAVE said that my opinion was that this was an abuse/misuse of the legislative powers â but thatâs different from acknowledging what the applicable precedent is)
I read this differently
It is simply not fathomable that a Constitution that grants
Congress the power to remove a President for reasons including criminal behavior would deny
Congress the power to investigate him for unlawful conductâpast or presentâeven without
formally opening an impeachment inquiry.
this sounded to me that Mehta was saying that no âlegislative purposeâ was necessary to compel testimony about a presidentâs "unlawful conduct, past or present. i.e. that Congress can just say
we're going on a fishing expedition to look for dirt we might want to use
for impeachment at some point in the future. This has nothing to do with any laws
we intend to pass, we're just investigating because we can."
now I HOPE this is not what was said. I donât want it to be true. Iâd like to think that Congress canât dig for dirt with no purpose other than to embarass. So please tell me that Iâm wrong â that Mehta is still insisting that there be a âlegislative purposeâ behind any such investigation.
Good. Your tendentious caricature of the positions and now two thorough district court opinions is not actually what Mehta (or Ramos) said. Regarding the first quote, the rest of the opinion amply explains that position, and demonstrates that your caricature is exactly that. Investigation of the kind Congress is conducting is well within Congressâs purview, as explained by the judges and the cases they cite, including past history, notably Watergate, in which, as Judge Mehta mentioned, significant investigation took place before the formal impeachment inquiry commenced. The law does not state otherwise.
(clears throat)
Here, the Oversight Committee has shown that it is not engaged in a pure fishing expedition for the Presidentâs financial records. It is undisputed that the President did not initially identify as liabilities on his public disclosure forms the payments that Michael Cohen made to alleged mistresses during the presidential campaign.28 Furthermore, Michael Cohen has pleaded guilty to campaign finance violations arising from those payments.29 These events, when combined with Cohenâs testimony and the financial statements he supplied, make it reasonable for the Oversight Committee to believe that the records sought from Mazars might reveal other financial transgressions or improprieties. As already discussed, it is not unreasonable to think that the Mazars records might assist Congress in determining whether ethics statutes or regulations need updating to strengthen Executive Branch accountability, promote transparency, and protect against Executive Branch officials operating under conflicts of interest. Additionally, the Mazars record could provide the Oversight Committee with clues about the Presidentâs foreign interests or sources of foreign income, if any, which would assist in determining Congressâs obligations under the Foreign Emoluments Clause. This concern is not a new one.
Thatâs Judge Mehta calling bullshit on that one.
Two federal judges have now stomped all over this caricature. Itâs time to stop.
Yes, you are absolutely right. A well reasoned, well written opinion from a District Judge, is sometimes very much like a SCOTUS opinion. I am thinking of (Nixonâs last appointee to the SDNY) Thomas P. Griesaâs 200 plus page opinion halting the construction of Westway because it would endanger the Snail Darter. But also a lot of times, District Court judges will just rule on the record from the Bench and then request that the parties agree on a short form Order for the Docket, and from which one of the parties might (immediately or eventually) appeal.